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Abstract—In several critical military missions, more than
one decision level are involved. These decision levels are often
independent and distributed, and sensitive pieces of information
making up the military mission must be kept hidden from one
level to another even if all of the decision levels cooperate to
accomplish the same task. Usually, a mission is negotiated through
insecure networks such as the Internet using cryptographic
protocols. In such protocols, few security properties have to be
ensured. However, designing a secure cryptographic protocol that
ensures several properties at once is a very challenging task.
In this paper, we propose a new secure protocol for multipart
military missions that involve two independent and distributed
decision levels having different security levels. We show that it
ensures the secrecy, authentication, and non-repudiation proper-
ties. In addition, we show that it resists against man-in-the-middle
attacks.
Index Terms—Authentication, cryptographic protocol, dis-
tributed decision, independent decision, man-in-the-middle at-
tack, non-repudiation, secrecy, security level.
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, military concerns have been focusing on
protecting against leakage of sensitive data. A disclosure of
sensitive information can be costly in the military field [1]–[4].
The particularity in military operations is that they usually
involve several complicit entities, which can potentially
form a serious risk. Thus, any military system should be
designed based on cryptography to secure data exchange
between different military control units. Compulsory usage
of cryptographic protocols is the most successful measure to
reinforce security especially in military communications that
even selective encryption is not enough [5]–[8].
In many military use cases, a military mission requires
more than one decision level to be accomplished. It is called a
multipart mission. Often, the decision-makers are independent,
have different security levels, and communicate with each
other remotely throughout an unsecured network such as
the Internet. The resulting decision is so an aggregation of
distributed decisions. During the same mission, many actors
are involved and each one is requested to accomplish only his
part without knowing anything about the other parts. Hence,
the secrecy inside communications becomes a major challenge
as the secrets exchanged between the different actors must be
protected.
Moreover, considering that a military mission has bad
consequences upon failure, every actor must be able to prove,
anytime, that he had carried out, or not, a specific action. We
talk about the property of non-repudiation here. Besides, since
the different actors communicate with each other remotely
through an insecure network, every actor must be assured
that he communicates with the right actor prior to undertake
any action. For that, the authentication property must be
maintained in the protocol.
It goes without saying that an intruder has an impressive
set of capabilities [9]–[12] over the net. In fact, he is able to
intercept any message, redirect it, or decompose it. Besides,
he can encrypt or decrypt any message provided that he
possesses the required keys. The only thing he cannot perform
is to decrypt an encrypted message when he does not have
the decryption key. A secure protocol must closely consider
these facts to prevent any man-in-the-middle attack.
In this paper, we are proposing a new secure protocol for
military missions that require two independent and distributed
decision levels having two different security levels to be ac-
complished. The first level is referred to as the operational level
which determines the mission target (i.e. the location to be
bombed in the case of a strike operation). This level generally
involves both political and operational decision-makers whose
decision is issued from a remote command center. The second
level is referred to as the the logistic level. This level is con-
cerned with only planning, implementing, and controlling the
resources required by the mission. For example, it determines
which aircraft is going to be used, the takeoff and landing
runway necessary for the mission, and all other related logistic
aspects. The logistic level must behave as an active broker
between the operational decision-maker and the final mission
executor (i.e. the pilot). It receives the operational decision
cyphered, appends its logistic decision to it, and delivers the
resulting command to the mission executor. This is because any
information disclosure related to the operational decision (i.e.
the target to be struck) before the mission is finished may very
much lead to undesirable outcomes. Hereafter, we demonstrate
that our proposed protocol guarantees secrecy, authentication,
and non-repudiation. Moreover, it resists against man-in-the-
middle attacks. As far as we know, no cryptographic protocol
available in the-state-of-the-art guarantees all these security
properties at once as our protocol does, in a distributed and
independent decision levels’ context.
II. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The paper is organized as follows:
1) In Section III, we give the protocol definition (contribu-
tion);
2) In Section IV, we give the protocol chronology and we
discuss the secrecy and authentication properties (contri-
bution);
3) In Section V, we show that the protocol resists against
man-in-the-middle attacks (contribution);
4) In Section VI, we show that the non-repudiation property
is maintained inside the protocol (contribution);
5) In Section VII, we discuss some security issues of our
protocol and we compare with other related works, par-
ticularly with a chaotic protocol (contribution);
6) in Section VIII, we give a short conclusion.
III. PROTOCOL DEFINITION
The proposed protocol consists of the following seven
steps.
1. A→ S : {A.{NA.S.TSA}k−1a
.S}ks
2. S → B : {S.B.{B.NS .NA.A}k−1s
}kb
3. B → S : {B.A.S.NS}ks
4. S → A : {{B.NA.NS}k−1s
.A.S}ka
5. S → B : {
{OP _ACT.S.A.{A.NA.S.NS .B}k−1s
}ka .{S.NS}k−1s
}kb
6. B → A : {
{TSB .NS .NA.LOG_ACT}k−1
b
.
{OP _ACT.S.A.{A.NA.S.NS .B}k−1s
}ka .B.A.NA.NS
}ka
7. A→ B : {
{~(LOG_ACT.NA.NS)}k−1a
.A.B.S.TSB
}kb
Where:
• A: is the mission executor (e.g. a pilot) with a pair of
asymmetric keys (ka, k−1a ).
• S: is the operational decision-maker with a pair of asym-
metric keys (ks, k−1s ).
• B: is the logistic decision-maker with a pair of asymmet-
ric keys (kb, k
−1
b
).
• NA and NS: are nonces (random numbers).
• TSA and TSB: are typed timestamps.
• LOG_ACT : is the logistic action.
• OP_ACT : is the operational action.
• ~: is a hash function.
IV. PROTOCOL CHRONOLOGY AND STANDARD SECURITY
PROPERTIES
In this section we present the protocol chronology. Along
with that, we discuss how the protocol preserves the two
standard security properties: secrecy and authentication. Let
us see this in each step of the protocol.
1) In the step 1, the mission executor A remotely subscribes
on the mission executors’ availability list held by S. He
sends him his identity A, as well as a signed message
{NA.S.TSA}k−1a enclosing a timestamp that ensures
S about the freshness of the message, the identity of
the receiver S, and a nonce NA (a random number)
that will be a secret shared between both of them and
B and used by S and B once A is selected to be
assigned to a mission. The signature in {NA.S.TSA}k−1a
authenticates A to S. The secrecy of NA is ensured by the
encryption of the whole message with the public key of S;
2) In the step 2, S urges B that a mission is about to take
place involving A. Beside his identity S and the identity
of B, S sends to B a signed message {B.NS .NA.A}k−1s .
This signature authenticates S to B. Besides, B receives
the identity A of the mission executor, the nonce NA
previously issued by A, and a nonce NS issued by S.
This latter guarantees the freshness of the message. The
secrecy of the two nonces is ensured by the encryption
of the whole message with the public key of B;
3) In the step 3, B replies to S by sending him the message
{B.A.S.NS}ks . S sees his nonce NS and gets assured
that B is henceforth aware that a mission is going to take
place. The authentication of B to S is now established
since he is the only to have received NS . The secrecy of
NS is ensured by the encryption of the message with the
public key of S;
4) In the step 4, S urges A that he has been selected to carry
out a mission and he is about to be delivered the mission
instructions by B. These instructions will be discussed
in the step 6. The signed message {B.NA.NS}k−1s
authenticates S to A. The nonces NA and NS ensure the
freshness of the upcoming mission. The secrecy of the
two nonces is ensured by the encryption of the whole
message with the public key of A;
5) In the step 5, S sends B the message
{
{OP_ACT.S.A.{A.NA.S.NS .B}k−1s }ka .{S.NS}k−1s
}kb .
The enclosed message
{OP_ACT.S.A.{A.NA.S.NS .B}k−1s }ka is not
intelligible for B (encrypted with the public key of
A) because it contains the mission details related to the
operational decision-maker (i.e. OP_ACT ) that must be
shared between S and A only. The encryption with the
public key of A guarantees the secrecy of theses details.
The enclosed signed message {S.NS}k−1s ensures B that
the whole messages truly comes from S. The nonce NS
ensures the freshness of the message;
6) In the step 6, B sends a three-part encrypted
message to A. The first part is the signed message
{TSB.NS.NA.LOG_ACT }k−1
b
that contains the
details concerning the logistic part of the mission
(i.e. LOG_ACT ). It contains also the timestamp that
guarantees the freshness of the message as well as the
nonces NA and NS that ensure that this step is connected
to the previous ones. The signature ensures A that the
received message truly comes from B. The second part
{OP_ACT.S.A.{A.NA.S.NS .B}k−1s }ka is exactly what
B received from S during the previous step. It contains
the operational mission details (i.e. OP_ACT ) as well
as a signed message {A.NA.S.NS .B}k−1s that guarantees
that it truly comes from S. The last part B.A.NA.NS
contains the nonces NS and NB as well as the identity
of the sender and the receiver. The duplication of the
nonces in the three parts guarantees that they have the
same freshness and are related to the same mission. Now
A has the complete and authentic information to execute
the mission;
7) In the step 7, A acknowledges B that he receives
all the required instructions to carry out the
mission. B, upon receiving the signed message
{~(LOG_ACT.NA.NS)}k−1a , gets assured that the
message truly comes from A and the freshness of this
message is guaranteed by the nonces. The timestamp
TSB guarantees the freshness of the whole the message.
V. RESISTANCE AGAINST MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS
A man-in-the-middle attack [13]–[18] arises when an
intruder succeeds to send an illegitimate message to a regular
agent and this latter naively accepts it because there is no
way for him to know whether it is legitimate or not. The
illegitimate message issued by the intruder is a message
intercepted during previous runs of the protocol or within
previous steps of the running instance of it. When we
designed our protocol, we bore in mind this famous sort of
attack. Therefore, we designed it in such a way that any
two messages exchanged in the protocol do not overlap by
carefully choosing the position [19], [20] of agent identities,
signed messages, nonces, etc. in every single message.
Besides, we made sure that the freshness of all the messages,
when received, could easily be verified by the receiver. Let us
see this in each step of the protocol.
1) In the step 1: S receives the message
{A.{NA.S.TSA}k−1a .S}ks . Upon decryption, S observes
that the identity of the sender A appears first, then
appears the signed message {NA.S.TSA}k−1a , then his
identity S. This structural pattern does not overlap with
any of the other messages exchanged in the protocol.
So, he concludes that the message is a regular one and
was truly originated by A. Besides, the presence of the
timestamp and the nonce guarantee that the message is
fresh and not an old one intercepted and resent by the
intruder;
2) In the step 2: B receives the message
{S.B.{B.NS.NA.A}k−1s }kb . Upon decryption, B
observes that the identity of the sender S appears first,
then appears his identity B, then the signed message
{B.NS .NA.A}k−1s . This structural pattern does not
overlap with any of the other messages exchanged in the
protocol. So, he concludes that the message is a regular
one and was truly originated by S. Besides, he can verify
that the pair (NS , NA) has never been used before and
hence make sure that the message is fresh and not an
old one intercepted and resent by the intruder;
3) In the step 3: S receives the message {B.A.S.NS}ks .
Upon decryption, S observes that the identity of the
sender B appears first, then appears the identity of the
mission executor A, then appears his identity S, then
appears a nonce NS . This structural pattern does not
overlap with any of the other messages exchanged in
the protocol. So, he concludes that the message is a
regular one and was truly originated by B. Besides, he
can verify that the message is fresh by verifying that the
nonce NS is the same one he generated in the previous
step;
4) In the step 4: A receives the message
{{B.NA.NS}k−1s .A.S}ka . Upon decryption, he observes
that the signed message {B.NA.NS}k−1s appears first,
then his identity A, then the identity of the operational
decision-maker S. This structural pattern does not
overlap with any of the other messages exchanged in the
protocol. So, he concludes that the message is a regular
one and was truly originated by S. Besides, he can
verify that the pair of nonces (NS , NA) has never been
used before and hence he makes sure that the message
is fresh and not an old one intercepted and resent by the
intruder;
5) In the step 5: B receives the message
{
{OP_ACT.S.A.{A.NA.S.NS .B}k−1s }ka .{S.NS}k−1s
}kb .
Upon decryption, B observes that the signed message
{S.NS}k−1s including the identity of the operational
decision-maker S and its nonce NS appears in the last
position. This structural pattern does not overlap with
any of the other messages exchanged in the protocol.
So, he concludes that the message is a regular one and
was truly originated by S. Besides, he can verify that
the nonce NS is the same one received from S in the
step 3 to make sure that the message is fresh and not an
old one intercepted and resent by the intruder;
6) In the step 6: A receives the message
{
{TSB.NS.NA.LOG_ACT }k−1
b
.
{OP_ACT.S.A.{A.NA.S.NS .B}k−1s }ka .
B.A.NA.NS
}ka .
Upon decryption, A observes that the messages ends
with the string B.A.NA.NS , in which appear the identity
of the logistic decision-maker B, then his own identity
A, then his own nonce NA, then the nonce NS of the
operational decision maker S. This structural pattern does
not overlap with any of the other messages exchanged
in the protocol. So, he concludes that the message is
a regular one and was truly originated by B. Besides,
he can verify that the nonce NA is the same one he
generated in Step 1 and hence he gets assured that the
message is fresh and not an old one intercepted and
resent by the intruder;
7) In the step 7: B receives the message
{
{~(LOG_ACT.NA.NS)}k−1a A.B.S.TSB
}kb .
Upon decryption, B observes that the message ends with
a timestamp. This structural pattern does not overlap with
any of the other messages exchanged in the protocol.
So, he concludes that the message is a regular one and
was truly originated by the mission executor A. The
timestamp, as well as pair of nonces (NS , NA), ensure
that the message is fresh and not an old one intercepted
and resent by the intruder.
Hence, we conclude that the protocol resists against the
man-in-the-middle attacks.
VI. ABOUT THE NON-REPUDIATION PROPERTY
The repudiation occurs when an agent can deny an action
he carried out in the protocol without being able to prove the
opposite from the protocol rules [21]–[23]. This cannot happen
in the proposed protocol. In fact, in the previous section, we
have shown that every message exchanged in the protocol has
a unique structural pattern that characterizes it and prevents it
from overlapping with any other message. Besides, we have
shown that the freshness is always maintained. Moreover, in
each step of the protocol, the identity of the sender appears
in the sent message, either explicitly, or in an enclosed signed
message, or in both. For example, in the step 3, the identity
of the sender, who is the logistic decision-maker B, explicitly
appears in the sent message {B.A.S.NS}ks . In the same vein,
in the step 4, the identity of the sender, who is the opera-
tional decision-maker, explicitly appears in the sent message
{{B.NA.NS}k−1s .A.S}ka as well as in the enclosed signed
message {B.NA.NS}k−1s . In addition, all the encryptions use
asymmetric keys. The non-repudiation property is so guaran-
teed in the protocol.
VII. DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON WITH RELATED
WORKS
In this paper, we have proposed a new protocol for multipart
military missions involving two independent and distributed
decision levels. A decision-maker could be either a physical
military staff or an intelligent software application. We have
shown that it verifies the following security properties: secrecy,
authentication and non-repudiation. We have also shown how
and why this protocol resists against any man-in-the-middle
attack. Our protocol is designed to be a tagged protocol. In
fact, tagging [24] is a syntactic annotation added to protocol
messages to fill the verification procedure and the protocol
gaps. It is a simple technique that facilitates the decoding of
incoming messages, giving a good protocol design. Tagged
protocols are indeed less prone to errors. This is mean that
under attacks, a tagged version could be more secure than an
untagged one. Tagging prevents also from type-flaw attacks
[25] by preventing the substitution problem. The substitution
problem is a hard problem in cryptographic protocols and is the
source of well-known man-in-the-middle attacks. It consists in
substituting a regular message by another message intercepted
by an intruder in previous executions of the protocol and taking
advantage of the ignorance of the receiver of some components
of that message and the fact that it could not perform any
verification upon. For instance, let us have a look at a flawed
version of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [13],
[26], [27] given by Table I. In this protocol the nonces Na and
Nb are supposed to be two secrets shared between the regular
agents A and B only. To attack this protocol, an intruder I
executes the first step, but instead of sending a regular nonce
to the agent B he sends his identity. The agentB when receives
{A.I}kb wrongly believes that the identity I is a nonce sent by
the agent A. Then, he executes the second step of the protocol
by sending the message {I.Nb.B}ka to A. Upon reception,
the agent A wrongly believes that he is receiving a message
from an agent I executing the first step of the protocol where
the concatenated string Nb.B is his supposed nonce Ni. So, he
executes the second step of the protocol and sends the message
{Nb.B.NA.A}ki to I . Ultimately, the intruder I has just to
decrypt that message and ends up revealing the secrets Nb
and Nb. This attack is given by Fig. 1.
TABLE I
A FLAWED VERSION OF THE NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER PUBLIC-KEY
PROTOCOL
1. A −→ B : {A.Na}kb
2. B −→ A : {Na.Nb.B}ka
3. A −→ B : {Nb}kb
Fig. 1. A MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK ON THE NEEDHAM-
SCHROEDER PROTOCOL DUE TO THE SUBSTITUTION PROBLEM
I
{A. I
︸︷︷︸
Ni(A)
}kb
B
B
{I.Nb.B
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ni
}ka
A
A
{Nb.B.Na.A}ki
I
I: is the intruder
This attack could have been prevented if, in the first step
the sent message had been {Na.B.A}kb , and in the second
step the sent message had been {Na.Nb.B.A}ka . Should this
have been the case, the identity of the receiver would have
appeared in the second position in the first sent message, last
in the second sent message, and wouldn’t have appeared at all
in the third message. This would have been enough to make
every encrypted pattern unique in the protocol and would have
precluded any message from overlapping with another one, and
hence, the substitution problem could have been avoided. This
solution that we are proposing to correct this protocol is given
in Table II.
TABLE II
A TAGGED AND CORRECTED VERSION OF THE NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER
PUBLIC-KEY PROTOCOL
1. A −→ B : {Na.B.A}kb
2. B −→ A : {Na.Nb.B.A}ka
3. A −→ B : {Nb}kb
The tag information is in fact added by honest agents to
precise the intended type of the message and the receiver uses
it to identify the message. Hence, tags ensure that a message
which has originally a given type cannot not be interpreted as
having another type, which is the type-flaw attack definition.
Moreover, tagging schemes are used for a decidability proof
[28]. Therefore, tagging prevents the unification of different
encrypted subterms and yields decidability. Tagging enforces
the proof termination [24], as well.
Back to our protocol, we have made sure that every sent
message is tagged so that it is always differentiable from all
other messages, and hence, the receiver can always perform
the necessary verifications to make certain, and in a sensible
way, that the message he is receiving is a legitimate one
and has not been intercepted and diverted by an intruder, as
explained above in each step of the protocol definition. The
substitution problem could never happen in our protocol.
In an upcoming work, we are going to give the formal proof
of the security properties assured by the proposed protocol
using our recent theory called the theory of witness-functions
[29]. This theory proposes a series of functions that have been
successfully experimented on lots protocols and were powerful
either in detecting security flaws or in proving security proper-
ties inside cryptographic protocols [30]–[34]. Originally, they
were designed to prove secrecy inside protocols by proving
that the level of security of every atomic message exchanged
in the protocol does not decrease during its life cycle. Then,
they were extended to cover the property of authentication
[30], [31] by setting few sufficient conditions such that, if
met, the protocol is declared correct for authentication. On
the other hand, we will closely examine the behavior of
the protocol inside a multi-protocol environment [35], [36]
where several protocols run simultaneously. In fact, a given
protocol can be proven secure when it runs alone, but it might
be proven insecure when it runs simultaneously with other
protocols using the same encryption keys. Another issue that
should be looked after is the algebraic properties that the used
cryptographic protocols primitives could have. Such properties
could engender some annoying flaws. An example of algebraic
properties may be the homomorphic property [37], [38] where
{m1.m2}k is equivalent to {m1}k.{m2}k under the equational
theory [34], [39], [40].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new protocol for multipart military
missions involving two independent and distributed decision
levels, operational and logistic, has been presented. We have
exhibited the protocol chronology and explained how it fulfills
the secrecy and authentication properties in each step of
its definition. We have discussed as well how it guarantees
the non-repudiation property. We have also examined the
resistance of this protocol against the man-in-the-middle
attack and discussed the related security concerns. Finally,
we introduced to an upcoming work which consists in giving
the formal proof for the protocol security correctness using
the theory of witness-functions. In the same vein. we intend
to extend our protocol so that it can cope with more than two
independent and distributed decision levels. We will also keep
an eye on using variations of this protocol in cloud computing
where multipart tasks are intensively used and security is
highly required.
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